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Commenting on the close relationship between technological and le-
gal developments, Grant Gilmore once wrote: "The reason for the dra-
matic change in English law during the second half of the eighteenth
century is not far to seek. We know it as the industrial revolution."' His
insight, although directed to trends in commercial law in eighteenth
century England, is not limited to a particular legal discipline or a single
historical epoch. Indeed, the many new activities and products stem-
ming from recent technological innovations are provoking changes in
American law comparable in magnitude to those experienced during
the industrial revolution.
When legal rules change because of new technologies, they are usually
responding to the effects of those technologies, not the technical develop-
ments themselves. For example, the invention of electronic funds trans-
fer networks has brought substantial changes in the regulation of
banking, somewhat akin to the developments in negotiable instrument
and sale of goods law discussed by Gilmore in connection with the pas-
sage quoted above.2 Such changes in the law require of the courts only
an appreciation of a new, perhaps more rapid, means of transacting
business or communicating; an understanding of the underlying tech-
nology is not necessary.
There are, however, a number of important areas where changes in
the law require that judges have some appreciation of the actual tech-
nology involved. One such area is the regulation of the nuclear power
industry. Here the new technology has created a class of problems fun-
damentally different from those posed by the regulation of conventional
utilities. Accordingly, courts must devote some attention to nuclear
power technology to deal effectively with these problems.3 Another ex-
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ample comes from attempts to protect computer programs, or software,
from being wantonly copied. The courts have evaluated competing
claims as to whether any existing bailiwick of the law-e.g., patents,
copyrights, or trade secrets-should protect software. In the process,
they have been forced to come to terms with the nature and operation of
computer technology.
4
Various commentators have questioned whether courts are competent
to deal fairly and effectively with technology-related problems. Some
have suggested sweeping institutional reforms such as the creation of a
special court to resolve legal disputes arising out of complex technolo-
gies. 5 Others have criticized particular decisions for their technical na-
ivete; in so doing, they have implied that courts can and should come to
terms with technological issues. 6 All agree in one respect, however: dis-
putes concerning technologies themselves will only be effectively re-
solved through an understanding of technical issues.
A recent case dealing with computer software suggests that the judici-
ary is equal to the task. That case, Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklihn Com-
puter Corp.,7 held that computer software is copyrightable. The Apple
case is useful for more than its holding, however; it is also an instructive
paradigm for an appropriate and effective judicial role in technology-
centered cases.
I. Background of the Apple Case
The Apple case resulted from the intense competition between manu-
facturers of personal computers. Franklin Computer Company, an up-
start challenger to the relatively well-established Apple Computer
Company, began to sell an "Apple compatible" computer in the early
1980's. Franklin's chief selling point was that buyers could use software
written for the popular Apple II computer with Franklin's Ace 100
model. To make this possible, Franklin employees made copies of sev-
94 HARV. L. REV. 489, 511 (1981). See generally, Bazelon, Risk and Responsibility, in SCIENCE,
TECHNOLOGY, AND NATIONAL POLICY 356 (Kuehn and Porter eds. 1981).
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Analysis, 23 JURIMETRICS J. 337 (1983).
5. See, e.g., Yellin, supra note 3, at 555 (calling for the establishment of "a committee of
scientists, engineers, and lawyers to act as standing masters in complex environmental cases
[footnotes omitted]"). See generally Tribe, Technology Assessment and the Fourth Dscontinuity: The
Limits of Instrumental Rationahty, 46 S. CAL. L. REV. 617 (1973); Note, The Role of the Courts in
Technolog Assessment, 55 CORNELL L. REV. 861 (1970).
6. See, e.g., Brooks, Interrelationshtp of Copyright and Trade Secrets, in SOFTWARE PROTEC-
TION: CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN COPYRIGHT AND PATENT AND THEIR RELATIONSHIP
TO TRADE SECRET 309, 322-328 (Brooks and Keplinger eds. 1982) (arguing that several fed-
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Yale Law & Policy Review
eral of Apple's operating system programs.8 Apple filed a suit in federal
court alleging in part that Franklin infringed its copyrights in these pro-
grams. The district court denied Apple's motion for a preliminary in-
junction.9 Apple appealed on the copyright issue.
In legal terms, the case hinged on whether object code and operating
system programs are copyrightable. What was really at issue, however,
was the cost to Franklin of marketing a computer that could use
software written for the Apple II. Franklin was trying to avoid the costs
incurred by Apple in developing an Apple II operating system. By hold-
ing that Franklin had infringed Apple's copyrights, the court rewarded
Apple for being a technological innovator and penalized Franklin for
not developing its own operating system programs.
II. Object Code Is Copyrightable
The object code version of a program is a more mathematical,
machine-oriented version than the original, source code version. Source
code is a series of quasi-English instructions. Examples of source code
programming languages include BASIC, Fortran, and Pascal. But pro-
grams are routinely translated from source code into object code,' 0 so
source code copyrightability alone does not help those who, like Apple,
wish to protect their programs from infringement.
The Apple court recognized that object code must be copyrightable
for software to be meaningfully protected. Accordingly, it rejected
Franklin's two major arguments to the contrary.
Judge Sloviter, writing for a unanimous Third Circuit panel, rejected
Franklin's first contention-that object code is uncopyrightable because
it is unintelligible to humans. Relying heavily on the language and leg-
islative histories of the 1976 Copyright Act and the 1980 amendment, I I
Sloviter declined to follow the case on which the intelligibility argument
was built, White-Smith Music Publishhng Co. v. Apollo. 12 In While-Smith,
decided in 1908, the Supreme Court held that a piano roll was an un-
copyrightable embodiment of a musical composition, since it was
8. 714 F.2d at 1245. ("Franklin did not dispute that it copied the Apple programs. Its
witness admitted copying each of the works in suit from the Apple programs.")
9. 545 F. Supp. 812 (E.D. Pa. 1982), rev'd 714 F.2d 1240 (3rd Cir. 1983).
10. See generally V. HAMACHER, Z. VRANESIC & S. ZAKY, COMPUTER ORGANIZATION 301
(1978) (explaining the program translation process).
11. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 101, et seq., Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541
(1978). The 1976 Act was a substantial reworking of copyright law; it was amended by the
Software Copyright Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-517, § 10(a), 94 Stat. 3028 (Supp. 1983),
which provided that owners of copyrighted programs could make backup copies and included
a general definition of a computer program.
12. 209 U.S. 1 (1908).
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unintelligible to humans. Judge Sloviter addressed the intelligibility
doctrine by citing a passage from the legislative history of the 1976 Act
showing that the Act "was intended to obliterate distinctions engen-
dered by While-Smith .' 13 In addition, Judge Sloviter pointed out the
logical inconsistency between the intelligibility argument and section
101 of the Copyright Act of 1976.14 The court stated:
[T]he definition of "computer program" adopted by Congress in the 1980
amendments [to the 1976 Act] is "sets of statements or instructions to beused direct~ or indredty in a computer in order to bring about a certain
result." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (emphasis added). As source code instructions
must be translated into object code before the computer can act upon
them, only instructions expressed in object code can be used "directly" by
the computer.
15
Judge Sloviter also rejected the defendant's second major argument,
that object code is uncopyrightable because it has a utilitarian pur-
pose. 16 Her opinion distinguished a copyrightable work such as a pro-
gram from the useful functions which that work may serve. The court
used the example of an instruction booklet for a complex machine. It
observed that although the booklet does something useful, i.e., explains
how to operate the machine, this does not preclude copyright
protection. 
17
This holding should help resolve a debate that has simmered for some
time in the academic literature. 18 The debate concerns the "true" na-
ture of object code and software in general. The two positions can be
summarized as: (1) object code is just another means of expression, and
(2) object code is like a machine part since a computer cannot work
without it. The court sided with those who advance the first position.
This is encouraging, not because the court made the "correct" choice,
13. 714 F.2d at 1248.
14. 17 U.S.C. 101 (1978 & Supp. 1983).
15. 714 F.2d at 1248.
16. Franklin argued that because object code has a utilitarian purpose, it is protectible, if
at all, only by the patent laws. Patent protection for computer programs has been discussed
for a number of years. See, e.g., Schmidt, Legal Propretay Interests in Computer Programs.- The
American Experience, 21 JURIMETRICS J. 345, 355-362 (1981). Under the leading case, only
programs that are part of a more comprehensive process may be patented. Diamond v.
Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981). This is a largely unsettled area, however; the current trend in the
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (which used to be called the Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals) is towards a liberalization of the Diehr holding. Compare In re Taner, 681 F.2d
787 (1982) with In re Pardo, 684 F.2d 912 (C.C.P.A. 1982) and In re Abele, 684 F.2d 902
(C.C.P.A. 1982) (computer algorithm for correcting seismic wave data held unpatentable in
Taner, while patents for similar algorithms were upheld in Pardo and Abele).
17. 714 F.2d at 1252.
18. See Stern, Another Look at Copyright Protection of Software." Did the 1980 Act Do Anything for
Software?, 3 COMPUTER/LAW J. 1 (1981); Stern, The Case of the Purloined Object Code.- Can It Be
Solved?, Parts I and II, BYTE MAGAZINE, Sept., 1982 at 420 and Oct., 1982 at 210. Contra:
Davidson, supra note 4; Brooks, supra note 6.
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but because the judges felt confident enough of their understanding of
object code to rule decisively.
This holding is one example of why Apple should serve as a paradigm.
The judges on the court drew on the testimony of expert witnesses in the
record and the written technical summaries presented by both sides.1 9
They used these facts to form a basic understanding of what object code
is and how it works. Each adversary presented information that sup-
ported his case, but the court was able to take this into account when
evaluating testimony. The court's sound conclusions are not only a trib-
ute to its perspicacity; they also demonstrate the effectiveness of the ad-
versarial process in resolving technology-based disputes.
III. Operating ystem Programs Are Copyrzhtable
Besides the copyrightability of object code, the Apple opinion effec-
tively resolves another complex issue: the copyrightability of operating
system programs. Operating system programs are essential components
in any computer system. They allow the keyboard to supply data to the
microprocessor chip that is the heart of the computer. These programs
also coordinate the reading of program instructions and data from exter-
nal media such as floppy diskettes. Most importantly, they allow "ap-
plication" programs such as financial planning models and word
processors to run on a given computer.
Franklin contended that Apple's operating system programs were not
copyrightable under section 102(b) of the 1976 Copyright Act,2 0 which
codified Baker v. Selden .21 In Baker, the Supreme Court held that defend-
19. The opinion refers several times to the testimony of both Apple's and Franklin's ex-
pert witnesses. See, e.g., 714 F.2d at 1245. The Third Circuit in general and Judge Sloviter in
particular were familiar with the general technical concepts presented by the case due to their
involvement with a video game case involving software issues, Williams Electronics, Inc. v.
Arctic International, Inc., 685 F.2d 870 (3d Cir. 1982), and from consultation of outside
sources, e.g., Note, Copynght Protection of Computer Program Object Code, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1723
(1983). Attorneys for both sides included appendices to their briefs that explained technical
aspects of software, such as how software is written and what object code looks like. Accord-
ing to one of Apple's attorneys, Judge Sloviter did not appear to use sources outside the
record to resolve technical issues. Telephone interview with Lawrence Scarborough, Brown &
Bain, P.A., Phoenix, Arizona (Feb. 6, 1984). It should be noted that in several cases where a
judge has consulted a technical source outside the record, the result has been less than satis-
factory. The trial court in Apple, for instance, mistakenly cited a passage from a book describ-
ing programmers who write microcode to support its position on object code. 545 F. Supp. at
822 n.14 (quoting from T. KIDDER, THE SOUL OF A NEW MACHINE (1981)). Microcode is
the basic set of instructions in a computer. Each object code instruction is broken down into a
series of microcoded instructions. Microcode is actually "burned into" the microprocessor.
Unlike object code, therefore, microcode is arguably part of the "device" and thus patentable.
See generally Toong, Microprocessors, 237 SCd. AM. 146, 152 (1977).
20. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1978).
21. 101 U.S. 99 (1879).
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ant's bookkeeping instruction manuals did not infringe the plaintiff's
copyrights in similar accounting manuals. Defendant's blank account
books, the court held, used only the method, and not ,the exact expres-
sion, of plaintiff's books. 22 Baker is enshrined in Section 102(b) of the
copyright statute, which prohibits copyright protection for any "process,
system, or method of operation"; in short, for any idea-as opposed to
its expression.23 Franklin argued that operating system programs are
part of the "process, system, or method of operation" of a computer.
Therefore, they should be precluded from copyright protection under
the rationale of Baker.
The court flatly refused to adopt this expansive reading of section
102(b). Instead, Judge Sloviter pointed out that "Apple does not seek to
copyright the method which instructs the computer to perform its oper-
ating functions but only the instructions themselves."'2 4 Thus, Franklin
may re-create, but not copy, Apple's operating system programs. The
programs' method of operation is not proteqted, but the instructions
used as a particular expression of this method may be.
Franklin also claimed that Apple's operating system programs mo-
nopolized the ideas on which they are based. Consequently, the court
next considered a line of cases holding that a particular expression may
not be copyrighted if it is one of a very limited number of ways to ex-
press an idea. 25 Because of the sparse evidentiary record, the court felt
constrained to remand the case for further consideration on this point.
But it framed the issue so that Franklin had little chance for success by
stating that "If other programs can be written or created which perform
the same function as an Apple's operating system program, then that
program [sic] is an expression of the idea and hence copyrightable.
'26
The court gave the following example:
The idea of one of the operating system programs is. . . how to translate
source code into object code. If other methods of expressing that idea are
not foreclosed as a practical matter, then there is no merger [of idea and
expression]. Franklin may wish to achieve total compatibility with inde-
22. Id. at 100.
23. 714 F.2d at 1250 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 102(b)). This language alludes to the distinction
between copyright and patent protection for computer programs. See generally note 16, supra.
24. 714 F.2d at 1251.
25. 714 F.2d at 1253 (citing Morrissey v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 379 F.2d 675 (1st Cir.
1967) and Freedman v. Grolier Enterprises, Inc., 179 U.S.P.Q. 476 (S.D.N.Y. 1973)). The
Morrissey case involved an attempt by the plaintiff to copyright a set of contest rules; the court
held that the rules could not be copyrighted, since this would amount to copyrighting the
game itself. Freedman involved an attempt, similarly rejected, to copyright a set of bridge
cards containing the numerical point total for each card. Note that the merger cases are but
one illustration of the general copyright principle forbidding protection of an idea, as opposed
to its expression. See Baker v. Selden, supra note 21.
26. 714 F.2d at 1253.
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pendently developed application programs written for the Apple II, but
that is a commercial and competitive objective which does not enter into
the somewhat metaphysical issue of whether particular ideas and expres-
sions have merged.
27
Subsequent events proved the court right. In its settlement agree-
ment with Apple, Franklin conceded that it had developed its own set of
operating system programs to take the place of Apple's.2 8 This demon-
strates that the ideas embodied in Apple's programs had indeed not
merged with their expressions.
The merger issue is clothed in difficult technical arguments. The de-
velopment of programs that "emulate" Apple's was no doubt a difficult
and expensive task. At the time of the court's ruling, there was even
considerable debate among programmers as to whether it was possible
at all. 29 The court, however, did not get lost in this technical thicket,
but ruled in accord with a fundamental precept of the copyright system:
innovators should be rewarded.
This ruling illustrates two points. It shows again that courts are capa-
ble of deciding issues having a technical component. Also, it points out
the wisdom of having the courts decide both the technical and legal
questions embodied in a dispute. The Apple court was able to consider
all aspects of the dispute before it-legal and technical. It could address
the economic underpinnings of the case in the face of uncertainty as to
the accuracy of its technical determination.30 As it turned out, the
judges were both technically correct and fair.
IV. Conclusion
Apple demonstrates that the judiciary has the capacity to resolve dis-
putes arising from new technologies. The Apple court exhibited two
characteristics needed to resolve such disputes: a willingness to learn
about the technologies involved, and an awareness of the ways in which
27. Id.
28. Franklin andApple Settlement, N.Y. Times, Jan. 7, 1984, at Dl, col. 2 (reporting that
besides paying Apple $2.5 million in damages, Franklin agreed to "substitute another [operat-
ing] system [which it has developed] that it said would still make it possible for Franklin
machines to use the programs and information designed for Apple computers.")
29. Compare Davidson, supra note 4, at 371, with Reply Brief for Appellant at 19, Apple
Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983). Davidson asserts
that at least some of Apple's operating system programs cannot be emulated; Apple's experts
claimed that all of Apple's operating system programs could be emulated.
30. It is interesting to note that Apple would probably have lost if a separate tribunal had
decided that, as a strictly technical matter, it was impossible for Franklin to develop operat-
ing system programs to take the place of Apple's. Such a binding ruling could conceivably be




the legal and technical aspects of the disputes are intertwined. Accord-
ingly, the decision stands as an exemplar of technical competence and
legal acuity.
